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• I examine the impact of mobility restrictions on labor ﬂows in the West Bank.
• Increases in border closures raise the
unemployment rate and reduce outmigration.
• A one standard deviation rise in the number of closures costs $1 million per day.
• Mobility restrictions deter out-migration
to Israel more than the settlements.
• The return decision is driven by
low wages and lacking valid legal
documentation.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper examines the impact of labor mobility restrictions such as border closures, physical obstacles and unequally accessed ID cards and work permits on the labor ﬂows of West Bank residents. The results demonstrate
that for Jerusalem residents, mobility restrictions reduce out-migration but they are much more pronounced in impeding out-migration to Israel proper than to Israeli settlements. Additionally, an increase in the number of border
closures per quarter has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the odds of facing unemployment for all groups, but is
especially high for migrant workers residing outside of Jerusalem. A lower bound estimate of the economic cost of a
50 day increase in the number of border closures (1.78 standard deviations) per quarter is about USD 1.7 million per
day in the subsequent quarter. The paper also concludes that the determinants of out-migration differ from those of
return-migration. For example, while border closures and unemployment status during previous visits are strong
determinants of out-migration, the decision to return is driven by relatively low wages and lacking the necessary
legal documentation to enter Israel. The ﬁndings in this paper are consistent with international studies that ascribe
inefﬁciency in labor markets to restrictions on labor mobility across regions.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
An increased level of labor mobility is a key step to attaining efﬁcient
labor allocation as well as enhancing economic development and
growth. One way labor mobility can lead to efﬁcient outcomes is
by encouraging out-migration from labor-intensive countries to
capital-intensive countries (Hamilton and Whalley, 1984; Iregui,
2005; Docquier et al., 2015). And yet, the political climate can interfere
with how labor is allocated across countries. Conventional economic
theory posits that individuals migrate if the expected beneﬁt from migration exceeds the expected costs (Sjaastad (1962)). The migration decision involves evaluating the difference between the expected wage in
the host country and the current wage in the source country, differences
in social welfare beneﬁts (e.g. government housing in the host country
vs. living in one's parent's house in the source country), the monetary
cost of migrating, loss in social capital, and the cost of acquiring the skills
necessary to thrive in a new job and/or labor market (e.g. learning a new
language or on-the-job training) (Chiquiar and Hanson (2005);
Rosenzweig (2007); Gould and Moav (2008)). However, such a basic
model does not provide much insight into the heterogeneity of the migration decision among potential immigrants.
There are two dominant models that economists have used to study
such heterogeneity. One model, often referred to as the Roy model (Roy
(1951)), was applied to the immigration decision by Borjas (1987) and
suggests that who decides to immigrate depends on the relative wage
distributions of the source and host countries. That is, low-skilled immigrants are attracted to countries with less inequality than their country
of origin, while high-skilled immigrants are attracted to countries with
higher inequality than their respective source country. The intuition is
straightforward: more equal countries directly or indirectly “tax”
individuals at the top of the wage distribution and redistribute to lowwage earners, thereby generating a more compressed wage distribution. Thus, low-wage earners potentially gain from more concentrated
wage distributions and have higher economic incentives to migrate to
countries where wages are relatively equally distributed. The same
logic is used to argue that high-skilled workers will migrate to countries
with a higher rate of return to skill as evidenced by a more unequal
income distribution. While the model is quite stylized – relying on
some strong simplifying assumptions such as that migration costs do
not increase or decrease with skill level – it has much intuitive appeal.
One challenge to the Roy model is that there is suggestive evidence
that migrants from developing countries characterized by high income
inequality to countries with lower income inequality are more likely
to be high-wage and skilled workers (Grogger and Hanson (2011);
Belot and Hatton (2012); Rosenzweig (2007)). These results are contrary to the predictions of the Roy model. To reconcile the literature,
Gould and Moav (2008) propose that the Roy model is a more accurate
predictor of selection for internal migration patterns (Borjas et al.
(1992); Abramitzky (2011)) as opposed to international migration
patterns because international moves involve additional costs of
migration,2 including cultural barriers, wars, language requirements,
the presence of local networks in the host and source countries, immigration policy in the host country and perceptions or biases of the
host country in the source country.
Indeed, a burgeoning literature on global migration ﬂows has shown
that labor mobility restrictions – in the form of stringent immigration
policies including quotas, point-based systems, visa requirements, and
increased border patrols in developed countries – have rapidly diminished incoming migration ﬂows for developed countries (Mayda,
2010; Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013; Ortega and Peri,
2009). This literature identiﬁes immigration policy as a major deterrent
of global labor ﬂows by using aggregate country level data such as the
average income per capita at the destination country, country ﬁxed
2
Note that all migration costs are assumed to be constant across skill levels in Roy's
model.
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effects, and variables that measure the degree of tightness of entry in
a given country. The methodology is intuitive since countries have varying immigration policies, and differences in income across countries are
likely to shape prospective migrants' decisions. While the results are informative and interesting, the problem is that country-level data are
noisy and can yield inconsistent estimates. The aim of this paper is to
quantify the effect of Israel's border policies on the labor ﬂows of West
Bank residents using individual micro-level panel data.
The West Bank is a natural context to investigate the role of mobility
restrictions on labor ﬂows. Firstly, following the eruption of the second
intifada (uprising) in September 2000, West Bank residents were subjected to heightened security measures leading to several forms of
labor mobility restrictions such as border closures and mandatory procurement of a permit upon entry.3 Another advantage of setting this
study in the West Bank is the availability of micro-level household
panel data from the 2000 to 2010 waves of the Palestinian Labor Force
Survey (PLFS). These data allow the econometrician to observe the earnings and employment statuses of West Bank residents both in the
source country (West Bank) and the host country (Israel); and thirdly,
the data are longitudinal which means that I can estimate the economic
tradeoffs for the immigration decision (and the decision to return) better than most previous studies. Finally, studying migration patterns in
the West Bank allows for a more accurate and complete analysis of
labor ﬂows since the unique political circumstances in the region separating West Bank residents from Israeli residents result in data which
consists of (at least theoretically) a representative sample of migrants
and return-migrants.
Using similar data, Miaari and Sauer (2011) show that border closures in the West Bank have a negative impact on labor market outcomes such as Palestinian employment in Israel and mean earnings.
Furthermore, Calì and Miaari (2012) approximate the costs of internal
closures to the West Bank economy at USD223 million in 2007 by measuring the effect of closure obstacles on hourly wages and the number of
working days. This paper contributes to the literature by quantifying the
effect of mobility restrictions on labor ﬂows rather than labor market
outcomes. For example, to what extent do internal and external closures
hinder out-migration? Are there differences with respect to migrant
destinations? Are the factors that deter out-migration different from
those that encourage return-migration? In a context of high frequency
circular migration, are ﬁrst-time migrants affected differently from circular migrants? To what extent are ex-migrants absorbed by the local
economy when stringent border policies are implemented? In the
West Bank and other developing nations where political turmoil is common, remittances are a major source of income, contributing more than
ﬁve times as much as the sum of foreign aid and foreign investment
(World Bank). Hence, there is a state of urgency for researchers and
policy makers to understand the gains and losses associated with
restricting labor to both the sending and receiving countries in order
to make appropriate policy recommendations concerning immigration
policy.

2. Background
2.1. Migrant or commuter?: the special case of West Bank migrant workers
According to the United Nations, a migrant worker is “a person who
is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of
which he or she is not a national.” Palestinian workers in Israel or the
settlements qualify since they are not citizens of Israel but are receiving
payments for working on neighboring Israeli land (see Map), which
3
This study focuses solely on the West Bank since the number of Gaza residents working in Israel diminished rapidly after Israeli withdrawal of the settlements in 2005 and
came to a complete halt after the implementation of the blockade in June 2007 (Adnan,
2014b). Thus, for most years, there is neither sufﬁcient variation for the number of migrant
workers nor the number of closure days per quarter in Gaza.
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Map. Map showing the territory under Palestinian control and Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

includes Israel proper as well as Israeli settlements (denoted by triangles on the Map) in the West Bank. One distinguishing feature of Palestinian migrant workers is that they are not allowed to reside in Israel
due to the nature of the conﬂict, and therefore, must commute daily
to Israel.4 Hence, one may question whether Palestinians qualify as migrants or merely commuters. Indeed, in the context of globalization and

4
For the majority of the paper, Israel implies “Israel or the settlements” since the econometrician cannot distinguish between the two in the main survey used, the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (see data section). When data from the supplementary survey – the
Social Survey of Jerusalem (SSJ) – is described and analyzed, then the distinction between
Israel and Israeli settlements is made.

increased labor mobility, the line between migrant and commuter is
ever more blurred. For example, following the enlargement of the
European Union, terms such as trans-national migration and crossborder commuting were introduced to investigate the economic consequences of the (relatively) free movement of workers across nations
within the EU (Kahanec and Zimmerman, 2009; Kaska and Paas,
2013). While the term ‘migration’ usually refers to one-off moves for
permanent residence, this notion is challenged by an emerging literature on less conventional forms of migration, such as circular, temporary
and seasonal migration (Constant et al., 2013; Hugo, 2013). Technically,
West Bank residents who commute daily to Israel for work can be considered cross-border commuters or temporary/circular/seasonal
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migrants. However, in most contexts, (cross-border) commuters are citizens of the country of employment or citizens of countries that have bilateral trade agreements with the country of employment and thus, are
usually granted much more freedom of mobility than is typically the
case with migrants.5 Upon entry of the host country(s), many migrants
face stringent immigration policies that usually limit their mobility. In
the West Bank, this is especially the case because Palestinian workers
in Israel must confront these challenges daily when crossing the border.
Thus, throughout this paper, I refer to Palestinian employees of Israel as
migrants, although they commute daily to work.
2.2. Border closures and closure obstacles
Another convention that is speciﬁc to Palestinian–Israeli migration is
the source and nature of migration costs across West Bank residents:
mobility restrictions in the form of politically-determined barriers.
These costs include a combination of physical barriers and border patrols that limit and may even prohibit Palestinian labor from entering
Israel due to political or security reasons. The three main types of
politically-determined barriers used throughout this paper are: a) the
number of comprehensive closure days per quarter, b) the number of
closure obstacles per West Bank district per quarter, and c) the ID
card/permit status of an individual worker.
The number of comprehensive closure days per quarter reﬂects the
number of days the Israeli border was completely closed off from the
Palestinian territories.6 During closure days, the movement of people
and goods is prohibited even if Palestinians have legal documentation
to work or enter Israel. Nevertheless, some Palestinians continue to
work on Israeli land during closure days by crossing illegally or through
informal arrangements with Israeli ofﬁcials and security personnel.
Fig. 1 presents the number of comprehensive closure days in each quarter from the year 2000 to 2008. The graph demonstrates immense volatility from one quarter to the next during the second intifada, which
began in the third quarter of 2000 and continued almost until Israel's
blockade of Gaza in June 2007 for more information on the effect of
the blockade on Gaza's residents, see (Adnan, 2014b)7; both events
are depicted by vertical reference lines in the graph above. Spikes in closure days can be explained by major political events that took place.
Note that in the ﬁrst three quarters of the year 2000 (prior to the second
intifada), there were no comprehensive closure days in the Palestinian
territories. Another impediment to labor mobility is the presence of closure obstacles.8 Closure obstacles are physical obstacles primarily
intended to separate Palestinian areas from Israel. The most common
form of closure obstacles is the checkpoints manned by Israeli soldiers
to ensure Palestinians enter Israel legally (more on this in the next subsection — ID card/permit status).
2.3. ID card/permit status
The third mobility restriction explored in this paper is a resident's ID
card. For West Bank residents, there are two types of ID cards: a Jerusalem ID card and a West Bank ID card. A Palestinian obtains a Jerusalem
ID card if his/her parents lived within the borders of Jerusalem when
Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 following the Arab–Israeli war.
5
An example of cross-border commuters in the context of the West Bank is the Jewish
settlers who reside in Israeli settlements on the West Bank and commute to Israel proper
daily for work.
6
Data on comprehensive closures in the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza) are obtained from B'tselem, an Israeli human rights organization.
7
The end date of the second intifada is disputed since the violence has only partially
subsided over the years and increased again recently. However, the death of Arafat, the
president of the Palestinian territories, for over three decades, in November 2004 and
Israel's disengagement from Gaza which was completed in August 2005 are used as the
most common markers for the end of the second intifada. Therefore, I used the average
date – the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 – as a marker for the end of the second intifada.
8
Data on closure obstacles during the period 2004–2010 are obtained from the United
Nation Ofﬁce of Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
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Otherwise, a Palestinian is issued a West Bank ID card, administered
by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Jerusalem ID cardholders have
lower migration costs than West Bank ID cardholders because Jerusalem ID cardholders are permanent residents of Israel, enjoy national insurance and social beneﬁts, and are free to move and work throughout
Israel and the West Bank without entry or work permits. As permanent
residents, Jerusalem ID cardholders are protected by Israeli labor law,
which grants them at least the Israeli minimum wage plus beneﬁts.
West Bank ID cardholders must not only obtain work permits to work
in Israel but must also renew them every three months. The process of
acquiring and renewing work permits is cumbersome especially during
times of political instability as security measures are heightened. One alternative, which many have opted for, is to work in Israel without a
work permit and become an undocumented worker which can result
in highly punitive repercussions.

3. Data
3.1. Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS)
The primary dataset I use in this paper is a micro level longitudinal
dataset from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) administered by
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. The PLFS of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip is a quarterly household survey that investigates the
labor force characteristics of Palestinians living in the territories. The
questionnaire is designed such that households are interviewed for
two consecutive quarters, dropped for the next two quarters and then
re-interviewed for the following two quarters, allowing one to construct
short longitudinal panels. In this paper, I restrict the sample to males between the ages of 18–64 years that were surveyed between 2000 and
2010.9 In general the response rate was approximately 90%. One drawback of the data however is that during the last two quarters of 2001,
the response rate was less than 40% due to the cycle of extreme violence
that took place during the initial phases of the second intifada.
These data have several unique features in the context of testing different models of migration. Due to the nature of the conﬂict and proximity of the West Bank and Israel, residents of the West Bank cannot
reside on Israeli land but can procure Israeli jobs while continuing to
live in the West Bank. This distinguishing feature of the West Bank
coupled with the longitudinal nature of the data allows the econometrician to observe wages and other employment characteristics of a representative sample of West Bank residents, regardless of their place of
work. Thus, the econometrician can observe wages of recent (return)
migrants in both, the West Bank and Israel, without being concerned
about which migrants moved permanently to Israel. Secondly, information about migrants' employment and earnings in Israel is included for
both documented and undocumented migrant workers so that the latter are not under-represented either. Unfortunately, the PLFS does not
provide data on ID type for individuals employed in the domestic sector,
which can limit the analysis on the decision to migrate since migration
costs can vary substantially depending on ID type. Another shortcoming
of the PLFS data is that migrant workers in Israel cannot be distinguished from those in Israeli settlements. This can be problematic
since working in Israel may have considerable costs and beneﬁts relative
to working in the settlements for a majority of workers.10 Because of
these two disadvantages of the PLFS data, I supplement the analysis
with the Social Survey of Jerusalem (SSJ) data.
9
I exclude women because they generally have low labor force participation rates and
conditional on being employed, women are concentrated in the domestic sector which
does not allow sufﬁcient variation to explore the migration decision. I exclude years prior
to 2000 because 2000 was the ﬁrst year longitudinal data was available. Prior to 1999 the
data can only be used for cross-sectional analyses; in 1999, housing and individual IDs
were inconsistent and could not be matched across units of time.
10
For example, according to KavLaOved, Palestinian migrant workers in Israeli settlements suffer from adverse work conditions and are paid below the minimum wage.
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where Y * is a latent variable greater than 0 if individual i works in Israel
and earns a positive wage while residing in district d in quarter t. Xit
represents a set of individual covariates such as years of schooling,
age, age squared, marital status, refugee, head of household, locality
type (i.e. urban, rural, refugee camp), and industry and year ﬁxed
effects. Regional variables are also included to capture the variation
across regions in migration opportunities such as the number of Israeli
settlements as well as local labor market opportunities. Cidt represents
the migration costs which include proxies for mobility restrictions and
their interaction terms with regional variables in the West Bank:
North, Central, South, Jerusalem. Finally, εidt is a residual with a standard
logistic distribution. Eq. (1) is estimated by a maximum likelihood function where the conditional probability of working in Israel is:
PrðY idt ¼ 1Þ ¼

Fig. 1. The number of comprehensive closure days per quarter in the West Bank, 2000–2008.
Source: B'tselem (2008).

3.2. Social Survey of Jerusalem (SSJ)
The 2005 wave of the Social Survey of Jerusalem is administered by
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The target population
was all Palestinians who reside in the greater Jerusalem area (area J1 or
J2) for at least 6 months out of the year. Data collection was initiated on
April 12, 2005 and completed on June 13, 2005. The dataset includes a
total of 3300 households, where 2240 households resided in J1 and
1060 households resided in J2. The sample is restricted to male workers
between the ages of 18 and 64 years old. The overall response rate was
75%.11 These data are richer than the PLFS data in that Palestinians who
work in the settlements (16% of all migrant workers in this dataset) can
be differentiated from those who work in Israel. Furthermore, individuals report whether they possess a Jerusalem ID card or a West Bank
ID card, but unfortunately, those who work in Israel without a permit
cannot be detected in this survey. Two other disadvantages of the SSJ
survey are that the data are neither longitudinal nor nationally representative since they only cover residents of the Greater Jerusalem
area. While both surveys have shortcomings, they both offer sufﬁciently
rich data to identify the extent in which mobility restrictions impede
migration ﬂows in the West Bank.
4. Empirical strategy
Following Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1987), I model an individual's
decision to migrate as a cost–beneﬁt analysis. That is, Palestinians seek a
job in Israel when the (expected) Israeli daily wage exceeds the (expected) daily wage in the West Bank net of total migration costs. I
model this decision using a logistic regression where the probabilities
are bound between 0 and 1. To isolate the effect of mobility restrictions
on labor ﬂows, socioeconomic controls are used as covariates to control
for characteristics that increase one's propensity to become a migrant
worker.
Y idt  ¼ βX idt þ γC idt þ εidt

ð1Þ

11
This is a relatively low response rate and was primarily due to closures in the region as
well as the building of the separation barrier. The response rate in the 2003 wave of the
same survey was approximately 89%.

1
:
1 þ expð−βX idt −γC idt Þ

ð2Þ

One question that arises with this speciﬁcation is whether the proxies for mobility restrictions in this paper are endogenous to the error
term in Eq. (1). For example, if Israeli implementation of the number
of closure obstacles and/or closure days is primarily driven by Palestinian aggression towards Israel, which in turn negatively affects Israel's
economy, then an individual's propensity to work in Israel may decline
due to lower future expectations of Israeli wages. This implies that the
impact of mobility restrictions (γ) in Eq. (1) are downward biased,
exaggerating the (negative) effect of border closures. While the cycle
of violence surely had an adverse effect on Israel's economy, a study
by Fielding and Shortland (2005) shows the decline in tourism can account for almost the entire difference in the budget deﬁcits between
1999 and 2004, a period of great political turmoil.12 Since Palestinian
residents of the West Bank rarely worked in Israel's tourism industry,
the spillover effect of the intifada (post-September 2000) on
Palestinians' decision to migrate through a downward turn in Israel's
economy is likely minimal.
A similar argument is that Israel's product market suffered such
great losses after the intifada (since goods were not traded as regularly
as before) that Israel's overall economy contracted, making migration a
less lucrative opportunity for West Bank residents. The negative shocks
that took place in Israel's tourism industry and Israeli exports to the
West Bank could have indeed affected all Israeli sectors to varying
degrees but the intifada actually had a much stronger and more
comprehensive impact on the economy of the West Bank than Israel's
economy. In fact, according to the Bank of Israel, losses in Israel were
between 0.7% and 1.8% of GDP in 2003; in the West Bank however,
GDP decreased by 24.4% between 1999 and the end of 2002 (Aljuni,
2003; Merli, 2003). Therefore, it is unlikely the case that the ongoing
cycle of violence discouraged out-migration by reducing the expected
wage gain from migration. Given the deterioration of the West Bank
economy, the expected wage gain from working in Israel was probably
greater after the intifada than before the intifada. Thus, it is likely that
the coefﬁcients for closure days and closure obstacles in the speciﬁcation are biased upwards, underestimating the (negative) impact of
border closures and closure obstacles on the migration decision.
Another major concern is that the socioeconomic controls embodied
in (Xit) are weak determinants of the expected wage gain from migration if the transfer of human capital between the two labor markets is
limited. A typical problem in the literature is that counterfactual
wages must be computed for the entire sample to measure the expected
wage gain since the econometrician cannot observe wages for each individual in both labor markets. Alternatively, the expected wage gain
is estimated as the difference in the means of country-level wages or
GDP. To address both points, I fully exploit the panel nature of the
data by estimating a conditional logit model with individual ﬁxed
12
After 2004, Palestinian violence towards Israel subsided, possibly due to the building
of the West Bank barrier.
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effects, where only time-variant variables are regressors: the (log) daily
wage, proxies for mobility restrictions, interaction terms between
proxies for mobility restrictions and regions of residence, age, age
squared, year and quarter ﬁxed effects. In this model, the number of
times an individual is observed earning a wage in Israel is a sufﬁcient
statistic for the individual ﬁxed effect αi. Thus, the conditional probability of working in Israel during period t is given by:
PrðY idt ¼ 1jwit ; Z it ; C idt ; α i Þ ¼

1
:
1 þ expð−βwit −γC idt þ α i Þ

Table 1
Summary statistics by place of work (2000–2010).
Mean (SD)

(1)
Work in Israel

(2)
Work in the West Bank

Age

32
(10.0)
0.71
(0.46)
0.63
(0.48)
0.26
(0.44)
9.2
(2.9)
0.02
(0.14)
19.4
(6.1)
0.39
(0.49)
0.51
(0.50)
0.10
(0.30)
0.00
(0.03)
0.96
(0.19)
0.04
(0.19)
0.11
(0.31)
0.17
(0.38)
0.49
(0.50)
0.14
(0.35)
0.02
(0.13)
0.07
(0.26)
0.89
(0.31)
24,905

34
(10.7)
0.70
(0.46)
0.62
(0.48)
0.33
(0.47)
11.3
(3.8)
0.17
(0.38)
22
(5.8)
0.43
(0.50)
0.42
(0.49)
0.15
(0.35)
0.37
(0.48)
0.58
(0.49)
0.05
(0.22)
0.03
(0.17)
0.15
(0.36)
0.15
(0.36)
0.12
(0.33)
0.04
(0.20)
0.50
(0.50)
0.91
(0.29)
70,105

Married
Head

ð3Þ
Refugee

For each individual, the conditional probability of an event (e.g. earning a wage in Israel during the ﬁrst quarter but earning a wage in the
West Bank during the second quarter) is computed. Note that the individual ﬁxed effect, which includes the time invariant propensity to migrate,
is factored out of the error term. The identiﬁcation strategy here assumes
the idiosyncratic error term is either exogenous to or is positively correlated with mobility restrictions for two reasons. First, as noted above,
the West Bank economy suffered greater losses than Israel's economy
(see Appendix A). Second, since the model is only identiﬁed for individuals who are observed earning wages in both labor markets, heightened
security measures are less likely to deter individuals who have already
crossed the border. Thus, estimating this model captures a lower bound
for the impact of changes in mobility restrictions on labor ﬂows — specifically, changes in the log odds of becoming a Palestinian migrant — after
controlling for log wage, age, age squared, year and quarter ﬁxed effects
as well as unobserved individual heterogeneity for those whose wages
are observed in both labor markets.

Years of schooling

5. Results

Const

5.1. Descriptive statistics for West Bank male wage earners by place of work

Bachelor
Work days/month
Urban
Rural
Camp
Public
Private
Intl/foreign
Agro
Manu

Comm.
Trans

Table 1 reports the summary statistics for West Bank male wage
earners between the ages of 18 and 64 by place of work during the
period 2000–2010. Employees in Israel are about two years younger
than West Bank employees and are more likely to be single. Further,
as opposed to the latter of whom only 2% are college-educated, the corresponding statistic for the former group is 17%. While migrant workers
are more likely to live in rural areas than urban areas relative to domestic employees, they are also slightly less likely to have refugee status or
live in refugee camps. Israel's employees are largely concentrated in
Israel's private sector which contrasts the labor market in the West
Bank, where the government employed over one-third of employees.
This is consistent with the fact that the domestic private sector suffered
great losses during the intifada due to uncertainty and volatility in the
market as well as a limited safety net (Miaari, 2010). Almost half of migrants are employed in the construction industry, which has one of the
highest industry premiums in the Palestinian labor market, migrants are
also over-represented in agriculture, an industry associated with a wage
penalty in the West Bank (Adnan, 2014a). Thus, individuals who are
employed in the construction and agriculture industries have low levels
of educational attainment but are more successful in procuring Israeli
jobs possibly because their industry-speciﬁc work experience is more
transferable to Israel's labor market.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of key variables for each of
three key periods. The ﬁrst period represents the pre-intifada period
which includes only the ﬁrst three quarters of the year 2000. This period
marks a time of relative peace and stability where there are little to no
mobility restrictions. To contrast the pre-intifada period, the year 2002
was chosen to represent a time of considerable volatility and political
turmoil. Finally, the year 2010 is marked by continued recovery and represents the most current data available in this paper.
The ﬁrst four rows of Table 2 show the percentage of wage earners residing in each region of the West Bank. Note how the percentage of wage
earners in Israel who resided in Jerusalem increased by 28 percentage
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Service
Full-time
Observations

points, while the corresponding statistic for the remaining regions decreased substantially for residents of the Northern and Southern West
Bank. Since almost all Jerusalem ID card holders live in Jerusalem, then
it is likely that residing in Jerusalem serves as a proxy for possessing JID
cards which can then explain the dramatic rise in the percentage of Palestinian wage earners in Israel residing in Jerusalem. Indeed, between the
pre-intifada period and the year 2002, the percentage of wage earners
in Israel with a JID card rose from 13% to 42%. Another point worth mentioning is the drastic decrease (22 percentage points) in the number of
Palestinians working in Israel with a work permit. By the year 2010, the
percentage of wage earners in Israel comprised of Jerusalem residents
(and JID cardholders) decreased but remains more than twice as high
as during the pre-intifada level. For Palestinian wage earners in Israel
without a JID card, those with a work permit have increased and
exceeded pre-intifada levels while those working without a permit continued to dwindle at a much more rapid rate. This evidence is suggestive
of strictly enforced border restrictions after the intifada despite the relative increases in Palestinian migrants from regions other than Jerusalem.
Real wages decreased in both regions from pre-intifada levels, which
is consistent with the two neighboring economies having undergone a
severe economic recession from the cycle of violence, which led to a
decline in foreign investment and tourism. After the intifada, West
Bank wages gradually increased to pre-intifada levels while Israeli
wages rose sharply such that wages are $8 higher than in the year
2000. The latter may be due to changes in the composition of Palestinian
migrant workers, most of which either have a JID card or a work permit.
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Table 2
Mean estimates of key variable for wage recipients.
Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2000–2010 from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
Table of means

2000a
West Bank

2002
West Bank

2010
West Bank

2000a
Work in Israel

2002
Work in Israel

2010
Work in Israel

North

JID

0.34
(0.47)
0.11
(0.32)
0.31
(0.46)
0.24
(0.43)
–

0.32
(0.47)
0.11
(0.31)
0.30
(0.46)
0.27
(0.44)
–

0.41
(0.49)
0.09
(0.29)
0.26
(0.44)
0.24
(0.43)
–

PA with permit

–

–

–

PA without permit

–

–

–

Daily wages (US $2010)

23
(13)
5706

19
(24)
4227

24
(21)
7968

0.34
(0.47)
0.16
(0.37)
0.33
(0.47)
0.17
(0.38)
0.13
(0.33)
0.29
(0.45)
0.58
(0.49)
34
(11)
4148

0.16
(0.37)
0.44
(0.50)
0.24
(0.43)
0.16
(0.37)
0.42
(0.49)
0.07
(0.25)
0.52
(0.50)
29
(11)
1263

0.26
(0.44)
0.35
(0.48)
0.19
(0.39)
0.19
(0.40)
0.34
(0.47)
0.45
(0.50)
0.20
(0.40)
42
(17)
2768

Jerusalem
South
Central

Observations
a

The fourth quarter of the year 2000 is not included because the intifada began in September 2000.

5.2. Heterogeneity among migration destinations
This paper aims to identify the role of mobility restrictions on labor
ﬂows in the West Bank. However, Israel's immigration policy may restrict
labor unevenly across the two type migration destinations, Israel proper
and Israeli settlements. Further, the Israeli wage premium is presumably
higher in Israel proper and because Israeli ﬁrms located in the settlements
are less likely to adhere to Israeli labor law, this results in poor working
conditions, lower wages and fewer beneﬁts for Palestinian migrants
(Amro, 2008; Alenat, 2009). In order to assess the economic beneﬁts
and costs of becoming a migrant worker, two questions are asked: How
does the expected wage gain associated with becoming a migrant worker
inﬂuence the decision to migrate to the settlements relative to migrating
to Israel proper? How do mobility restrictions impact the likelihood of
working in the settlements relative to the domestic sector as well as the
likelihood of working in Israel relative to the domestic sector after controlling for the expected wage gain? To address these questions, I utilize
the 2005 wave of the Social Survey of Jerusalem.
To verify that the two datasets are similar, a table of means is constructed for the Social Survey of Jerusalem dataset and is compared to a
table of means (similar to Table 1) using the Palestinian Labor Force Survey data when restricted to a sample that includes only Jerusalem residents interviewed in the year 2005 (unreported). I ﬁnd that the two
datasets are highly comparable. To estimate the impact of the mobility
restrictions on the likelihood of becoming a migrant worker for more
than one destination option (Israel or an Israeli settlement), a multinomial logit model is estimated where the reference group refers to wage
earners who work in a West Bank ﬁrm. A multinomial logit model is appropriate because the dependent variable, place of work, is a categorical
variable which cannot be ordered in a natural way. An undesirable assumption of multinomial logit estimations is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The assumption implies that the odds of
working in Israel over the domestic sector do not change if an additional
alternative (settlements) is introduced. Tests suggest this assumption
does not hold in these data (unreported); nevertheless, previous attempts to relax the IIA led some researchers to conclude that applying
the more complex nested or mixed logit models resulted in small
changes in the model's estimation while being much more computationally burdensome (Dahlberg and Eklöf, 2003).
Table 3 presents the average marginal effects for three multinomial
logit speciﬁcations.13 In the ﬁrst model (columns (1) and (2)), only the
13
In the interest of space, see the relevant table for a description of the dependent
variable(s).

expected wage gain is included as a regressor. For domestic workers,
the expected wage gain is the difference between their counterfactual
wage in Israel and their actual wage in the West Bank. Using the method
outline by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), the counterfactual wage
distribution for domestic workers is computed by assuming domestic
workers are rewarded for their characteristics exactly like migrants.14 In
order to control for a quarterly time trend, all actual wage and counterfactual wage distributions are deviated from the quarter average. The results in column (1) suggest that a one percentage marginal increase in the
expected wage gain does not result in out-migration for migrants who
work in Israeli settlements but increases the probability of working in
Israel by 6.7 percentage points. However, after controlling for ID card, residence relative to the wall, and region of residence within Jerusalem, the
expected wage gain is economically and statistically signiﬁcant for both
migration destinations. The economic and statistical signiﬁcance of the
expected wage gain in column (3) can be explained by the fact that Jerusalem ID card holders earn higher wages and are also less likely to work in
the settlements; thus, the point estimate in column (1) is biased downwards due to omitted variable bias.
Although the expected wage gain is inﬂuential in the migration decision for both types of migrants, Jerusalem ID cardholders are less likely
to work in the settlements by 13 percentage points and more likely to
work in Israel by 29.6 percentage points. Similarly, living on the West
Bank side of the wall and living in the J2 area both increase the likelihood of working in the settlements and decrease the likelihood of working in Israel. Note how the variation explained by the covariates in
columns (3)–(4) increased by more than four-folds relative to columns
(1)–(2), suggesting that mobility restrictions explain an additional 300%
of the variation explained by the expected wage gain. The differences
between the two types of migrant workers are even starker when the
sample is restricted to full-time employees. The results in Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of socio-economic controls (unreported).
The inability to distinguish between the two types of migrant workers
in the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) conﬁnes the researcher
to examine labor ﬂows for only a broad deﬁnition of migrant workers, although there is considerable heterogeneity across migrants with different
destinations. Nevertheless, in the remaining analysis, I exploit the longitudinal nature of Palestinian Labor Force Survey (which is collected across all
quarters during the period 2000–2010 and across all regions of the West
14
The counterfactual wage distribution for domestic workers is equivalent to that of migrant workers after some reweighing which includes a probit model for the likelihood of
becoming a migrant worker. Regressors include the years of schooling, experience and
its square, locality type, private sector, industry and occupation ﬁxed effects.
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Table 3
Heterogeneity among migrant workers — working in Israel vs. the settlements — (Jerusalem residents — 2005).
Source: Social Survey of Jerusalem (2005) from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
Multinomial logit-marginal effects

All wage earners
Settlements

Expected wage gain

Full-time workers
Israel

Settlements

Israel

Settlements

Israel

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.004
(0.004)

0.067***
(0.009)

0.016***
(0.004)
−0.130***
(0.041)
0.047***
(0.013)
−0.044*
(0.025)
1567
0.119

0.025***
(0.009)
0.296***
(0.036)
−0.085***
(0.025)
0.177***
(0.044)

0.004
(0.003)
−0.087**
(0.039)
0.047***
(0.015)
−0.046*
(0.025)
1040
0.181

0.037***
(0.011)
0.318***
(0.043)
−0.116***
(0.028)
0.178***
(0.051)

Jerusalem ID card
Live on West Bank side of the wall
Live in East Jerusalem (J1) area
Observations
McFadden R2

1567
0.027

The table above displays the marginal effects for three multinomial logits: columns (1)–(2), (3)–(4) and (5)–(6). In all cases the reference group in the dependent variable includes wage
earners employed in a West Bank ﬁrm. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is 1 if a Jerusalem resident is observed working in the settlements and 0 if observed working in the
West Bank. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is 1 if a Jerusalem resident is observed working in Israel and 0 if observed working in the West Bank. Omitted categories include
individuals who possess a West Bank (PA) ID card and those who live on the Israeli side of the wall; for the region of residence, the omitted category is the Jerusalem 2 area. The dependent
variables in columns (5)–(6) are the same as the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) but workers are restricted to full-time workers only.
(Standard errors in parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 01).

Bank) to examine several key questions: To what extent do border closures and other mobility restrictions hinder out-migration and affect unemployment across the regions of West Bank? Further, how are these
estimates affected when controlling for unobservable individual heterogeneity? What are the determinants of out-migration and how do they
differ from those of return-migration?

5.3. What happens after the border is closed?
In columns (1)–(3) of Table 4, a logistic model is estimated during the
period 2000–2008 to quantify the impact of border closures on the log
odds of earning a wage in Israel. relative to the log odds of earning a
wage in the West Bank. In column (1), the dependent variable (equals
one if individual i earns a positive wage in Israel and 0 if individual i
earns a positive wage in the West Bank) is regressed on the number of
closure days per quarter divided by 100, regional dummies and interaction terms between regional dummies and the number of closure days
per quarter divided by 100. The coefﬁcients estimate the impact of changes in border closures on log odds of out-migration at the cross-section.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level to control for serial correlation of error terms among individuals living in the same district. The
negative estimates on the regional variables suggest that even in the absence of border closures, the log odds of working in Israel for residents
in the Northern, Southern and Central areas of the West Bank are lower
than those for Jerusalem residents by approximately one point. This
means the odds of working in Israel for Jerusalem residents is about
three times greater than other residents of the West Bank. The presence
of border closures reduces the odds further for those living outside the
Greater Jerusalem Area, but there is heterogeneity among the regions so
that those in the North are the most affected by changes in border closures while those in the South are least affected. The coefﬁcients of interest have the expected sign and exhibit both statistical and economic
signiﬁcance. For example, a 50 day increase in the number of closure
days in a given quarter reduces the log odds of working in Israel by
0.61 [50/100 ∗ (−1.31 + 0.09)] points for a resident living in the
Northern area of the West Bank.15 Note that increases in the number
of closure days raise the likelihood of migration for residents of the Greater Jerusalem Area. The (unexpected) sign can be explained if increases in
closure days lead to the deterioration of the local economy in the Greater
15

Throughout the paper, the results are reported as the log odds rather than the odds in
order to preserve the linearity of the speciﬁcation. This is especially important for
interpreting the coefﬁcients of the interaction terms.

Jerusalem area, compelling Jerusalem residents to exploit the use of their
Jerusalem ID cards by working in Israel (see Appendix A).
If increases in the number of closure days deter out-migration due to
third factors, then column (1) is misspeciﬁed. In column (2), socioeconomic covariates are included to mitigate omitted variable bias, and
year ﬁxed effects are also incorporated to control for temporal variation
in the propensity to migrate. Unlike the previous speciﬁcation, an increase in border closures has a negative effect on Jerusalem residents,
suggesting that border closures induce the more qualiﬁed of West
Bank Jerusalem residents to seek jobs in Israel. In addition to socioeconomic and temporal controls, district ﬁxed effects, a quarterly time
trend and interaction terms between district ﬁxed effects and a quarterly time trend are introduced to account for the social, political and economic conditions of potential migrants. The impact of changes in the
number of border closures substantially deters out-migration, though
it has little or no effect on residents of the Greater Jerusalem Area.
Not only do mobility restrictions prevent workers from procuring lucrative job opportunities across the border, but it is also highly likely
that many will not be absorbed by a fragile and dependent local economy, rendering them unemployed. In fact, as Fig. 2 shows, there is a clear
inverse relationship between the number of closure days per quarter
and the percentage of employed West Bank residents who earned a
wage in Israel during the period 2000–2008. Furthermore, there is a
positive relationship between the number of closure days per quarter
and the unemployment rate (Fig. 3). As shown in column (4), increases
in border closures have a robust impact on the odds of unemployment,
although the effect is dampened for Jerusalem residents. The sample is
limited to those who were recently unemployed and reported a wage
in the previous quarter. These speciﬁcations remove individuals who
may have been unemployed due to factors other than border closures
(e.g. no work experience, long unemployment spell). As expected, the
effect of closures is now more pronounced across all regions of the
West Bank for this sample. Further, the results suggest that even in
the absence of closures, Israeli jobs are less secure than local jobs; however, the presence of closures considerably widens the unemployment
gap between migrant workers and domestic workers.16
To quantify the effect of closures on unemployment in quarter t + 1,
conditional logit regressions are estimated in Table 5 for three distinct
groups of workers, each of which represents the reference group in its
16
The previous wage earned in Israel is used to control for omitted variable bias. For example, if those at the high end of the wage distribution were more likely to face unemployment than their counterparts, there will be a spurious positive effect of working in Israel
on the log odds of becoming unemployed.
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Table 4
The effect of border closures on becoming a migrant worker.
Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2000–2008 from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
Logit model

Working in Israel/settlements
(1)

Unemployed

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.58***
(0.06)
0.68***
(0.16)
0.86***
(0.15)
0.85***
(0.17)
−15.96***
(0.38)
−16.55***
(0.39)
−17.58***
(0.38)
X
X
14.63***
(0.27)
47,916
0.12

0.06
(0.07)
0.70***
(0.17)
0.56***
(0.06)
0.71***
(0.16)
0.95***
(0.15)
0.90***
(0.18)
−14.52***
(0.30)
−15.10***
(0.21)
−16.08***
(0.35)
X
X
13.01***
(0.35)
47,916
0.13

Previous Ln wage (US $2010)
Worked in Israel
Closure days/100
North ∗ closure days/100
South ∗ closure days/100
Central ∗ closure days/100
North
South
Central
Controls/year FE
District ∗ controls
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.09***
(0.02)
−1.31***
(0.18)
−0.63***
(0.13)
−0.88**
(0.35)
−1.12***
(0.13)
−0.92***
(0.02)
−1.15***
(0.37)

−0.22*
(0.12)
−1.02***
(0.21)
−0.43***
(0.15)
−0.65**
(0.33)
−1.31***
(0.24)
−1.21***
(0.16)
−1.42***
(0.45)
X

−0.02
(0.02)
73,841
0.05

−0.67***
(0.23)
73,841
0.15

−0.07
(0.07)
−1.22***
(0.13)
−0.64***
(0.17)
−0.71***
(0.24)
−6.86***
(0.36)
−7.20***
(0.21)
−7.10***
(0.35)
X
X
5.38***
(0.41)
73,841
0.18

0.27***
(0.06)
0.45***
(0.10)
0.62***
(0.04)
0.55***
(0.08)
−1.38***
(0.17)
−2.09***
(0.17)
−2.90***
(0.19)
X
X
1.30***
(0.26)
166,391
0.16

The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is 1 if a West Bank wage earner is observed working in Israel and 0 if observed working in the West Bank. In columns (4)–(6), the dependent
variable equals one if the resident is unemployed and 0 if employed. The samples in columns (5) and (6) are limited to West Bank residents who earned a wage in the previous quarter. The
omitted regional category is the Greater Jerusalem Area. Socioeconomic controls include a quadratic in the years of schooling and age, marital status, refugee, head of household, locality
type (urban, rural, refugee camp), industry dummies and year dummies. District controls include district dummies and an interaction term between district dummies and a quarterly time
trend. Standard errors are clustered at the district level for all speciﬁcations. (Standard errors in parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1).

% Employed in Israel

Fig. 2. Closure days per quarter and % employed in Israel over time.
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Fig. 3. Closure days per quarter and unemployment rate over time.
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local economy are the least likely to be affected. In columns (4)–(6),
the sample is limited to wage earners; the qualitative nature of the
results does not differ from those in columns (1)–(3).
Table 6 estimates the conditional logit regressions to quantify the
effect of border closures on the log odds of working outside the district
of residence (column 1), working in the district of residence (column
2) and unemployment (column 3) for migrant workers, relative to maintaining their migrant status. The results indicate that after accounting for
individual heterogeneity, as border closures increase, unemployment
status is by far the most likely labor force status outcome for migrant
workers, especially those who live outside of Jerusalem. Additionally, a
50 day increase in the number of border closures in a given quarter raises
the odds of employment in own district of residence by a factor of 1.3 to
1.5 but has almost no effect on migrant workers' odds of working outside
their district of residence relative to maintaining their migrant status.

Number of Closure Days per Quarter

speciﬁcation. Individuals are sorted into the groups based on their employment status during quarter t. The ﬁrst group consists of migrant
workers, the second group is comprised of domestic workers who
worked outside their district of residence and the third group includes
domestic workers who worked and resided in the same district. The estimates show that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, a
50 day increase in border closures in a given quarter raises the odds of
facing unemployment by a factor of 1.2 for Jerusalem migrant workers
and 2.5 to 3 for remaining migrant workers. The corresponding ﬁgures
for West Bank residents who live outside of Jerusalem but work in the
local economy are 1.8 to 2 for those employed outside their district of
residence and 1.2 to 1.5 for those who work in the same district of residence. A Wald test where coefﬁcients are compared across speciﬁcations rejects the null hypothesis that the effect of border closures is
uniform among the three groups. Jerusalem residents who work in the
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Table 5
The effect of border closures on unemployment by place of work.
Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2000–2008 from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
Logit model/ﬁxed effects

Closure days/100
North ∗ closure days/100
South ∗ closure days/100
Central ∗ closure days/100
Place of work for reference group
Observations

Full sample

Wage earners

(1)
Unemployed

(2)
Unemployed

(3)
Unemployed

(4)
Unemployed

(5)
Unemployed

(6)
Unemployed

0.47***
(0.16)
1.28***
(0.19)
1.54***
(0.19)
1.69***
(0.23)
Israel
15,727

0.02
(0.47)
1.39***
(0.50)
1.25**
(0.54)
1.25*
(0.69)
Out of district
3511

0.13
(0.14)
0.40***
(0.15)
0.80***
(0.15)
0.60***
(0.16)
Same district
35,892

0.45***
(0.17)
1.44***
(0.21)
1.69***
(0.20)
1.80***
(0.25)
Israel
13,230

−0.37
(0.53)
1.31**
(0.58)
1.53**
(0.62)
1.96**
(0.81)
Out of district
2359

0.18
(0.18)
0.32
(0.21)
0.70***
(0.21)
0.51**
(0.22)
Same district
16,933

The table above displays the coefﬁcient estimates for six conditional logit models with individual ﬁxed effects. The dependent variable represents the employment status of a West Bank
resident which falls into one of the following categories: a) employed in Israel, b) working outside of the district of residence, c) working in the district of residence or d) unemployed. The
dependent variable equals one if the individual is unemployed for all speciﬁcations. The reference group is determined by the ﬁfth row. The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations cover the entire sample
of labor force participants in columns (1)–(3) while the remaining columns estimate the same speciﬁcations except the sample size is limited to wage earners. The omitted regional category is the Greater Jerusalem Area. Controls include age, age squared and year and quarter ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level for all speciﬁcations. (Standard
errors in parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1).

Thus, while some migrant workers are absorbed by the local economy,
most are unlikely to work far from their district of residence during
times of conﬂict, even within the domestic economy.
When the sample is limited to wage earners, the log wage is included as a regressor since it is a time-variant variable and captures the effect of a wage change on migration (see equation (3)). The inclusion
of the wage is especially relevant if changes in the number of closure
days are associated with changes in the Israeli wage premium, biasing
the effect of changes in border closures on out-migration. As is shown
by the decline in the number of observations, all individuals who did
not report a wage in both countries were dropped. Columns (4) and
(5) show that after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity,
a one log point decrease (increase) in the Israeli wage relative to the domestic wage is associated with a signiﬁcant rise (decline) in the log odds
of working in the local (Israel) economy; this ﬁnding is consistent with
the positive impact of the expected wage gain found in Table 3. The results also indicate that increases in border closures continue to deter
out-migration and induce labor ﬂows towards the local economy
where workers are placed in jobs in the same district of residence, although the overall effect is attenuated.17 While informative, one must
keep in mind that these results are based on a small sample of West
Bank residents, all of which have already crossed the border, and thus
underestimate of the negative impact of closures. Moreover, these speciﬁcations do not allow the econometrician to disentangle the determinants of migration from those of return-migration.
5.4. Who migrates?
In column (1) of Table 7, a logit model is estimated where the dependent variable equals one if the individual is a migrant and 0 if the individual is a stayer (for the deﬁnition of migrants and stayers, see
description of Table 7 and Fig. 4). As expected, living outside of Jerusalem is associated with a lower likelihood of out-migration. This is exacerbated by the increase in closure days, which further decreases the
likelihood of becoming a migrant worker for domestic wage-earners
of all regions especially those of the Northern West Bank. The results
also suggest that high wage earners in the West Bank are more likely
17
Although the coefﬁcients of border closures in column (5) of Table 6 are not statistically signiﬁcant, the effect of an increase in border closures on out-migration can be tested for
each region separately by performing a Wald test: γR + γ = 0, where γ represents the effect of closures on out-migration and γR is the coefﬁcient of the region-closures interacted
term where R = North, South, or Central. The null hypothesis that an increase in the number of closure days has no effect on out-migration relative to working in the district of residence is rejected for residents living in the Northern (p = 0.07), Southern (p = 0.02), and
Central (p = 0.01) regions of the West Bank.

to becoming migrant workers. This result can be driven by the presence
of high-frequency circular migrations, who migrate and return on a frequent basis. Having worked in an advanced economy such as Israel may
provide circular migrants with more marketable skills, earning them a
higher wage in the West Bank.
To reduce the number of circular migrants from the analysis, I restrict the sample so that the remaining speciﬁcations estimate the log
odds of becoming a ﬁrst-time migrant or a migrant who has not worked
in Israel for over 15 months. In these speciﬁcations, the wage refers to
the last wage earned in the West Bank, which could have been reported
from any of the ﬁrst three visits. As displayed in column (2), those who
earn higher wages in the West Bank no longer have a competitive advantage in Israel's labor market, suggesting that circular migrants
drive the results in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation. Moreover, the adverse effect
of border closures is much more pronounced for prospective migrants
residing in the Northern region, while the remaining regions are less
affected. One explanation is that many of those who were recently
employed in the West Bank did not have sufﬁcient time to search for a
job in Israel and remained employed in the West Bank. Thus, the attenuated effect of border closures is possibly attributed to the lack of sufﬁcient variation in the dependent variable given the reduced sample size.
To increase the sample, I removed the wage from the regression and
added three indicator regressors in column (3): one if an individual was
unemployed one visit ago (the previous quarter), unemployed two visits
ago (one year ago), and unemployed three quarters ago (one year and
three months ago). With the exception of the Central West Bank, increases in border closures have a negative effect on the log odds of becoming a migrant worker.18 Additionally, the effect is more uniform
than in previous speciﬁcations, suggesting that border closures (and
other mobility restrictions) are less variable across regions for ﬁrst-time
migrants or low-frequency circular migrants. The inclusion of unemployment lags adds extraordinary explanatory power as can be seen by the
rise in the Pseudo-R2 between columns (2) and (3). Further the coefﬁcients are both statistically and economically signiﬁcant which implies
that several ﬁrst-time migrants or migrants who are returning to
Israel's labor market (after a long spell) are usually unemployed for several months prior to ﬁnding work in Israel. One explanation is that the
temporal costs of job search intensity are much higher in Israel. Further,
a Harris–Todaro effect is likely, where workers queue for Israeli jobs
given the large disparity between the expected Israeli wage and the
18
Since the previous log wage was removed from the regression in column (3), there
were 300 additional observations because these individuals were unemployed during
the previous three visits and did not report a wage. This explains the attenuated effect
of closures in column (2) (for all regions except the Northern region).
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Table 6
The effect of border closures on employment status for migrant workers.
Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2000–2008 from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
Conditional logit/FE reference group — working in Israel/settlements

Full sample
(1)
Out of district

a

Wage earners
(2)
Same district

(3)
Unemployed

(4)
Out of district

(5)
Same district

(6)
Unemployed

0.47***
(0.16)
1.28***
(0.19)
1.54***
(0.19)
1.69***
(0.23)
15,727

−2.86***
(0.41)
1.15
(0.93)
0.35
(1.13)
−0.45
(1.01)
−1.19
(1.49)
583

−3.70***
(0.17)
0.21
(0.27)
0.53
(0.46)
0.32
(0.32)
0.69*
(0.42)
4530

0.45***
(0.17)
1.44***
(0.21)
1.69***
(0.20)
1.80***
(0.25)
13,230

Ln wage (US $2010)

Closure days/100

0.06
(0.74)
0.75
(0.84)
0.39
(0.80)
0.25
(1.19)
891

North ∗ closure days/100
South ∗ closure days/100
Central ∗ closure days/100
Observations

0.24
(0.18)
0.82***
(0.22)
0.57***
(0.20)
0.57**
(0.24)
11,332

The table above displays the coefﬁcient estimates for six conditional logit models with individual ﬁxed effects. The dependent variable represents the employment status of a West Bank
resident which falls into one of the following categories: a) employed in Israel (reference group in all speciﬁcations), b) working outside of the district of residence (comparison group in
columns (1) and (4)), c) working in the district of residence (comparison group for columns (2) and (5)) or d) unemployed (comparison group for columns (3) and (6)). The ﬁrst three
speciﬁcations cover the entire sample of labor force participants in columns (1)–(3) while the remaining columns estimate the same speciﬁcations except the sample size is limited to
wage earners. The omitted regional category is the Greater Jerusalem Area. Controls include age, age squared and year and quarter ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level for all speciﬁcations. (Standard errors in parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1).
a
Since columns (4)–(6) limit the sample size to wage earners, the wage here refers to the individual's domestic wage in quarter t + 1 and the individual's wage in Israel in quarter t.

expected domestic wage. Indeed, using only data from the pre-intifada
period (2000 Q1–Q3) to isolate the Harris–Todaro effect prior to border
closures, I ﬁnd that unemployment status in previous quarters is a strong
determinant of out-migration (unreported). Since migrant workers are
typically less skilled (see Table 1) and are thus expected to face greater
adversity in the local labor market (Mansour, 2010), one expects heightened security measures to exacerbate the Harris–Todaro effect for these
workers. Column (4) shows that the effect of unemployment history is robust to the inclusion of the previous wage reported by West Bank earners.
5.5. Who returns?
Once migrants have succeeded in crossing the border, why
do they return? In columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, a logit model is

estimated where the dependent variable equals one if the individual
is a return-migrant and 0 if the individual is a migrant-stayer. The
ﬁnal wage has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on returning,
which is consistent with conventional migration models. Indeed,
those who earn low wages are the most likely to return for supply
reasons (lower Israeli wage premium) or demand reasons (lower
productivity). The results also show that once individuals successfully obtained jobs in Israel, increases in border closures signiﬁcantly
increased the likelihood of returning for residents of all regions. It
is worth noting that in the absence of closures, migrants residing
outside the Greater Jerusalem area are the least likely to return. As
expected, the Jerusalem premium increases when controls for legal
documentation are included. In addition, the impact of the previous
wage earned in Israel is attenuated in column (2), most likely

Table 7
Uncovering the determinants of migration.
Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2000–2010.

a

Previous Ln wage ($US 2010)

Closure days/100
North ∗ closure days/100
South ∗ closure days/100
Central ∗ closure days/100

Migrants

First-time migrants over 15 months

(1)

(2)

0.88***
(0.23)
0.22**
(0.09)
−2.36***
(0.39)
−0.77*
(0.07)
−1.35***
(0.27)

0.37
(0.39)
0.38
(0.59)
−2.56***
(0.84)
−1.15
(0.84)
0.23
(0.39)

Unemp_t − 1
Unemp_t − 2
Unemp_t − 3
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

−5.03***
(0.44)
21,457
0.271

−6.22***
(1.55)
6013
0.297

(3)

(4)

(5)

−0.94*
(0.56)
−1.61***
(0.57)
0.01
(0.69)
0.99**
(0.21)
1.42***
(0.25)
0.74***
(0.11)
0.97***
(0.25)
−4.20**
(0.55)
6316
0.431

0.62
(0.41)
0.05
(0.54)
−2.42**
(1.08)
−0.46
(0.69)
1.04***
(0.36)
1.37***
(0.24)
0.77***
(0.18)
0.99***
(0.19)
−6.73***
(1.55)
6013
0.345

1.43***
(0.16)
0.80***
(0.17)
0.82***
(0.18)
−4.69***
(0.75)
8653
0.414

The dependent variable in columns (1) is 1 if a West Bank resident is observed working in the West Bank in quarter q and working in Israel in quarter q + 1 and 0 if observed working in
the West Bank in both quarters. The sample in columns (2)–(5) is restricted to individuals who have been visited four times and did not work in Israel during the ﬁrst three visits. The
dependent variable is 1 if an individual works in Israel during the fourth visit and 0 if employed in the West Bank. Controls include age, marital status, a bachelor's degree, region dummies,
industry, district and year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Standard errors in parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1).
a
For columns (1) and (2), this variable refers to the log real wage reported in the previous quarter, but for column (4), the variable refers to the last log real wage the individual reported
which could be up to 15 months ago.

W. Adnan / Labour Economics 34 (2015) 86–99

WORK IN WEST
BANK

97

WORK IN ISRAEL/
SETTLEMENTS

quarter q

WORK IN ISRAEL/
SETTLEMENTS
quarter q+1
Migrants

quarter q

WORK IN WEST
BANK
quarter q+1
Stayers

WORK IN ISRAEL/
WORK IN WEST
BANK
quarter q+1
Return-Migrants

SETTLEMENTS
quarter q+1
Migrant-stayers

Fig. 4. How wage earners are categorized into migrants, stayers, return-migrants and migrant-stayers.

because Palestinian migrants who work legally in Israel are paid
higher wages.
As before, it is possible that some migrants have returned more than
once. To reduce the number of circular migrants, the sample in columns
(3)–(6) is restricted to individuals who have been visited four times
and were observed as Israeli employees only during their ﬁrst interview.
According to column (3), regions of residence have no signiﬁcant effect
on the likelihood of returning. Additionally, the sign for border closures
changes direction from the speciﬁcation in columns (1) and (2) for Jerusalem residents and is attenuated for residents of other regions. If circular
migrants are more likely to live in Jerusalem, it is likely that they work in
Israel when border restrictions are eased and work in the West Bank
when border controls are tightened as shown in columns (1) and (2).
However, when high frequency circular migrants are excluded, the permanent or long-term return may be negatively affected by border closures (for Jerusalem residents) due to the crippling effect of closures on
the local economy. The same logic can be extended to understanding
the effect of closures on the return of residents of other regions.
In column (4), controls are included for legal documentation, having
a substantial effect on region dummies to the extent that residing outside of Jerusalem has a large and negative effect on returning in the absence of closures. While closures continue to have a modest impact,
possessing a Jerusalem ID card (valid/expired work permit19) decreases
the odds of returning by a factor of 13 (3) relative to working illegally in
Israel. When the last wage reported in Israel is included in the regressions, it becomes more apparent that border closures have little or no
role in the decision of long-term return-migration (except in Jerusalem)
but that this decision is primarily driven by lacking legal documentation
and lower wages (and/or productivity).
6. Conclusion
This paper aims to shed light on labor ﬂows in a context of border
controls, physical closure obstacles and unequal access to legal documentation allowing entry, not unlike visa permits. Using a supplemental
survey on Jerusalem residents which distinguishes between those
working in Israel versus Israeli settlements, the evidence is suggestive
that various forms of labor mobility restrictions are more pronounced
in impeding out-migration within Israel proper relative to the settlements. Results from the main dataset demonstrate that increases in border closures deter out-migration and increase unemployment in the
West Bank (though the effect is more modest for Jerusalem residents).
19
It turns out that the results in columns (2), (4), and (6) are robust to alternative speciﬁcations, where this variable is modiﬁed so that it equals one only for workers who currently possess a valid work permit. This suggests that having an expired work permit is a
signal that an individual is reliable and suitable for working in Israel since he has already
passed a thorough background check when he received his initial work permit. Note that
the conventional fear that immigrants may “overstay” their visas does not apply here because Palestinian migrants could never reside in Israel. For more information on how visa
restrictions are used to restrict labor mobility, see Neumayer (2006).

In fact, a lower bound estimate of the economic cost of a 50 day increase
in the number of border closures (1.78 standard deviations) per quarter
is about USD 1.7 million per day in the subsequent quarter.20 These ﬁndings are consistent with the recent literature on the effect of stringent
immigration policies on migration ﬂows (Mayda, 2010; Bertoli and
Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013; Ortega and Peri, 2009; Docquier
et al.,2015).
The paper also concludes that the determinants of out-migration differ
from those of return-migration. For example, border closures and unemployment status during previous visits are strong deterrents of outmigration for ﬁrst-time migrants or migrants who have not worked in
Israel for over 15 months. In contrast, closures had little or no effect on
the decision to return for one-time migrants or those who have not
returned for over 15 months. Instead, the decision to return was primarily
driven by lacking the necessary legal documentation to enter Israel and
lower wages. Whether or not individuals migrate from one country or
area to the other is critical to both furthering our understanding of the
economic decisions of individuals and more importantly policy discussions. A close examination of who migrates can lead to better insights
on the welfare impacts of migration on both the source and host countries. This paper calls for a discussion concerning the welfare impacts of
labor ﬂows, which in this context are highly inﬂuenced by Israeli security
measures on Palestinian residents in the West Bank. This is especially relevant due to recent calls for West Bank autonomy and the lifting of the
Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, which was initiated in June 2007 and
continues to the present.
It is difﬁcult to test whether the escalation of the conﬂict leads to a
greater desire to work in Israel because as the conﬂict progressed,
Israel heightened security measures — usually in the form of increased
border closures and more stringent work permit requirements — making it more difﬁcult for West Bank residents to enter Israeli lands. However, one way to circumvent this problem is by using the number of
closure obstacles per district per quarter as a proxy for mobility restrictions rather than border closures, and noting the effect of closure obstacles on Jerusalem residents since JID cardholders are the most likely to
secure jobs in both the local economy and Israel. Indeed, when conditional logistic regressions are estimated to quantify the effect of changes
in the number of closure obstacles on the log odds of working outside
the district of residence (column 1), working in the district of residence
(column 2) and unemployment (column 3) for migrant workers,
20
Using the eve of the second intifada (2000 Q3) as a baseline, consider four types of
workers and their respective mean wages: those who work in Israel (39%; $33), those
who work outside their district of residence (8%; $23.3), those who work in the same district of residence (46.5%; $20.3) and those who are unemployed (6.5%; $0). The estimates
in Table 6 suggest that a 50 day increase in border closures will result in a labor force
where 23% work in Israel, 6% work outside their district of residence, 60% work in the same
district of residence, and 11% are unemployed. Using population statistics from the year
2010, daily wage losses are about $1.7 million but do include losses in the product market,
downward adjustment of wages in both sectors (see Table 2), declining foreign investment, and the negative effect of other heightened security measures on the local economy.

98

W. Adnan / Labour Economics 34 (2015) 86–99

Table 8
Uncovering the determinants of return-migration.
Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2000–2008.
Return migrants

a

Ln wage in Israel ($US 2010)

(2)

−0.58***
(0.14)

0.77**
(0.32)
0.59
(0.47)
0.72*
(0.39)
0.89*
(0.48)
−1.80***
(0.41)
−0.70**
(0.28)
−1.07***
(0.32)

−0.39***
(0.14)
−1.59***
(0.19)
−1.05***
(0.12)
0.75**
(0.33)
0.61
(0.47)
0.65
(0.40)
0.76
(0.49)
−2.59***
(0.45)
−1.67***
(0.34)
−1.72***
(0.37)

−4.09***
(1.50)
3.38**
(1.67)
4.93***
(1.56)
5.07***
(1.73)
0.24
(0.73)
0.63
(0.59)
−0.51
(0.78)

−2.59***
(0.47)
−0.94***
(0.23)
−3.49**
(1.54)
2.70
(1.71)
4.33***
(1.59)
4.56**
(1.78)
−1.66*
(0.86)
−1.67**
(0.75)
−2.61***
(0.92)

0.76
(0.54)
6484
0.0533

1.06*
(0.55)
6484
0.0854

−1.50**
(0.63)
2085
0.0847

0.75
(0.79)
2085
0.128

JID card
Had a valid work permit
Closure days/100
North ∗ closure days/100
South ∗ closure days/100
Central ∗ closure days/100
North
South
Central
Industry ﬁxed effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

One-time migrants who returned

(1)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

−2.07***
(0.40)

−1.73***
(0.41)
−2.30***
(0.57)
−0.68**
(0.31)
−4.79**
(1.91)
4.49**
(2.26)
4.52**
(1.99)
1.19
(2.58)
−1.91*
(1.00)
−1.99**
(0.89)
−2.46**
(1.04)
X
6.72***
(1.54)
1662
0.178

−4.87***
(1.81)
4.18*
(2.15)
4.47**
(1.88)
1.07
(2.52)
−0.26
(0.84)
−0.10
(0.69)
−0.79
(0.91)
X
5.70***
(1.50)
1662
0.148

The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) is 1 if a West Bank resident is observed working in Israel in quarter q and working in the West Bank in quarter q + 1 and 0 if observed working
in Israel in both quarters. For these two columns, the wage refers to the wage earned in Israel during quarter q. The sample in columns (3)–(6) is restricted to individuals who have been
visited four times and were observed as Israeli employees during their ﬁrst interview. The dependent variable in columns (3)–(6) is 1 if the individual is observed working in the West
Bank for the next three visits and 0 if the individual remains employed in Israel for the next three visits. (Standard errors in parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1).
a
Here, the wage refers to the Israeli wage reported during the ﬁrst interview. Controls include age, marital status, a bachelor's degree, district and year ﬁxed effects.

relative to maintaining their migrant status, the results show that Jerusalem residents are much more likely to work in Israel relative to working in their district of residence (see Appendix Table 1). Time in-variant
variables such as age, age squared, year and quarter ﬁxed effects are included as regressors, and standard errors are clustered at the district
level. The results are robust to speciﬁcations that are limited to wage
earners and where the log real wage (US $2010) is included in the regression to mitigate omitted variable bias (Appendix Table 1 columns
(4)–(6)). This result implies that increases in closure obstacles, which

is a signal that violence has escalated, induces several Jerusalem residents to seek jobs in Israel and exploit their residence status (similar
to procuring a Green Card in the US) to evade working in the deteriorating local economy.
Closure obstacles
As the intensity of the conﬂict grows, searches at checkpoints become more time consuming and thorough producing long queues for

Appendix A
Robustness checks — effect of district-level closure obstacles on employees in Israel.
Conditional logit/FE

Full sample
(1)
Israel

Wage earners
(2)
Israel

(3)
Israel

(4)
Israel

(5)
Israel

(6)
Israel

−1.12
(2.12)
3.24
(2.14)
1.14
(2.12)
2.89
(2.19)
Unemployed
9455

3.74***
(0.53)
−10.94
(13.24)
12.18
(13.20)
11.12
(13.23)
29.14
(19.81)
Out of district
501

4.32***
(0.21)
11.68***
(2.55)
−9.86***
(2.95)
−11.62***
(2.55)
−9.74***
(2.74)
Same district
3727

−1.45
(2.22)
3.58
(2.24)
1.49
(2.22)
3.25
(2.29)
Unemployed
8034

Ln wage (US $2010)
Closure Obs/100
North ∗ closure Obs/100
South ∗ closure Obs/100
Central ∗ closure Obs/100
Place of work for reference group
Observations

6.11
(7.46)
−4.77
(7.52)
−6.31
(7.47)
1.52
(10.44)
Out of district
707

7.29***
(1.71)
−5.26***
(1.80)
−7.29***
(1.72)
−5.68***
(1.83)
Same district
8248

Source: Palestinian Labor Force Quarterly Survey Data: 2004–2010 from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The table above displays coefﬁcient estimates for six conditional
logit models with individual ﬁxed effects. The dependent variable represents the employment status of a West Bank resident which falls into one of the following categories: a) employed
in Israel (dependent variable equals one for all individuals in this category), b) working outside of the district of residence (reference group in columns (1) and (4)), c) working in the
district of residence (reference group for columns (2) and (5)) or d) unemployed (reference group for columns (3) and (6)). The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations cover the entire sample of
labor force participants in columns (1)–(3) while the remaining columns estimate the same speciﬁcations except the sample size is limited to wage earners. The omitted regional category
is the Greater Jerusalem Area. Controls include age, age squared and year and quarter ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level for all speciﬁcations. (Standard errors in
parentheses ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1).
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employees going to and from work (for more information, see Appendix
A). Other examples of closure obstacles include earth mounds, road
blocks, trenches, and road gates. The most permanent and costly closure
obstacle for both Israel and the West Bank is the separation wall; like
other closure obstacles, the ofﬁcial purpose of building the separation
wall was to secure Israelis from Palestinian violence.21 Closure obstacles
usually separate Palestinian areas from Israel but if Israeli authorities
suspect the presence of local terrorist networks, closure obstacles can
be used to separate Palestinian areas from each other. The number of
closure obstacles per district per quarter depends on the geography of
the district, as well as recent political events, and there is a great deal
of variability across both quarters and districts. As an example, Figs. 1a
and 1b display the number of closure obstacles per quarter in the district
of Nablus and the number of closure obstacles per district in quarter 2 of
the year 2005.

Figs. 1a and 1b. Variability in the number of closure obstacles across districts and quarters.
a. The number of closure obstacles per quarter in the district of Nablus. b. The number of
closure obstacles per district during the second quarter of 2005.
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